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IX. CLASS ACTIONS BEFORE ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES
Introduction 2017 is the first year of the Trump Administration, and it was reasonable to expect major changes in (or at least attacks on) the contemporary law on class actions. But, so far, these attacks have fizzled. To be sure, the House of Representatives did pass the "Fairness in Class Action Litigation Act of 2017" (H.R. 985) by a close, party-line vote, and it would have significantly cut back on class actions (including by restricting the ability of a plaintiff's attorney to represent the same client in a class action more than once). 1 That legislation has gone nowhere in the Senate, and because it seems unlikely to pass, we will not analyze it in this memorandum.
Similarly, the Supreme Court has not granted certiorari in any major class action case, but it has granted cert in related cases. Three consolidated cases involving the relationship between the Federal Arbitration Act and the National Labor Relations Act will likely decide whether employees will be able to proceed collectively against employers or be required to arbitrate their claims individually; these cases will be heard at the Court's first session in October this term. 2 Overall, decisions at the Circuit Court level have been mixed, but no issue has yet surfaced that would materially change the class action status quo. The effect of recent decisions involving standing and mootness on class action practice have been minimal so far. A possible exception to this generalization involves the issue of "ascertainability," an implied requirement for class certification, where the Circuits are sharply divided. As of this writing, a petition for certiorari raising this issue is pending before the Court. The Federal Rules Committee has approved a modest reformation of Fed. R. Civ. P. 23, but its changes, while important to practitioners, are characteristically marginal in their likely impact.
Of course, this period could be the "calm before the storm," but we see little evidence of any sweeping changes. Indeed, in some areas (such as securities litigation) the rate of class action filings has recently soared. But the reasons for this surge are complicated. We give special attention in this memorandum to the context of securities litigation because it has seen a higher level of activity in overall filings, cases before the Supreme Court, and Circuit Court decisions.
A. SECURITIES LITIGATION
A. Overview
During the first half of 2017, securities class action filings soared to 246 cases (well above the average rate of 235 cases filed annually over the past five years). As many as 500 filings could occur this year if this trend persists (only the 508 cases filed in 2001 exceeds this level).
What is driving this growth? Although multiple explanations are possible, the clearest catalyst is the tendency of "merger objection" cases to migrate from state court to federal court (where they often seek federal jurisdiction based on alleged violations of the federal proxy rules). This may be a response to Delaware's encouragement of "forum selection" clauses (which the Delaware Corporations Code now expressly authorizes). These clauses require any suit alleging a breach of a fiduciary duty in the case of a Delaware corporation to be filed in Delaware. Because the Delaware case law is extremely critical of "disclosure only" settlements (in which, by definition, there is no cash payment, except to the plaintiff's attorneys) and will generally not permit fee awards in such cases, 3 plaintiff's counsel is motivated to avoid Delaware and sue in federal court (where the forum selection clause cannot apply). NERA Consulting estimates that one in five securities class actions filed in 2016 were "merger objection" cases, and that this percentage will be substantially higher in 2017. 4 Seemingly, the desire to avoid Delaware is flooding the federal courts with securities cases.
Nonetheless, Delaware's strategy may be working, as in 2016 of all public mergers valued at over $100 million, only 73 percent of these deals attracted litigation-the lowest rate since at least 2009.
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The median settlement in the first half of 2017 was $5.5 million, well below the median settlement for the last dozen years. This may again reflect the prevalence of "merger objection" cases, which typically settle on a "disclosure only" basis.
B. Statutes of Repose
In CalPERS v. ANZ Securities, Inc., 6 the Supreme Court resolved a Circuit split and curtailed its prior ruling in American Pipe & Construction Co. v. Utah, 7 to hold that the filing of a class action does not toll the 3-year statute of repose in Section 13 of the Securities Act of 1933. Section 13 establishes a one and three year statute of limitation for alleged violations of Section 11 of the 1933 Act: one year after discovery of the untrue statement, or "after such discovery should have been made by the exercise of reasonable diligence," but in no event more than three years after the sale of the security. In American Pipe, the Court had permitted the filing of the class action to toll the one year period, but in CalPERS, it has found that there can be no equitable tolling of the three year period. While American Pipe still applies to the one year period, the three year period is now an absolute bar. This means that if a class action settles after year three, no class member may at that point opt out and file an individual action (which is what plaintiff CalPERS had attempted to do in this case growing out of the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy). 4 See Stefan Boettrich and Svetlana Starykh, Mid-2017 Flash Update (finding that "merger objection" cases brought in federal court rose from 30 in the first half of 2016 to 58 in the second half and then to 104 in the first half of 2017) (NERA Consulting). 5 See Matthew D. Cain, et al., The Shifting Tides of Merger Litigation, (available at: https///papers.ssrn.com/abstract_id=2922121) at 5-6. 6 137 S. Ct. 2042 (2017) 7 414 U.S. 538 (1974) Almost certainly, this rule will similarly apply to the statute of limitations for Rule 10b-5 litigation (where the statute of limitation is two and five years). 8 Also, it is likely to apply outside the federal securities context to other statutes having a statute of repose provision (or arguably having one).
Thus, how does one determine if a limitations period in a statute represents a statute of limitations (and thus is subject to equitable tolling) or a statute of repose (and thus is not)? Writing for the 5-4 majority, Justice Kennedy found that statutes of limitations generally run from "'when the cause of action accrues'-that is, 'when the plaintiff can file suit and obtain relief.'" 9 In contrast, statutes of repose "begin to run on 'the date of the last culpable act of omission of the defendant'" 10 -such as the sale of the security. This distinction is likely to be litigated in future cases that provide only a single period of limitation.
The practical consequence of CalPERS is that many institutional investors will want to file a parallel individual action (which will likely be consolidated with the class action) before the three or five year statute of repose period runs out. It is likely that both sides will agree to let this suit lie dormant (both to economize on legal costs and because defendants would rarely want an individual suit to come to trial before the class action was resolved, as it could arguably give rise to offensive collateral estoppel).
A more troubling question involves how class counsel should respond to the approach of the three or five year statute of repose period. Often, the class action will not have been resolved by this period. In her dissent, Justice Ginsberg noted:
"As the repose period nears expiration, it should be incumbent on class counsel, guided by district courts, to notify class members about the consequences of failing to file a timely protective claim." This will be costly, but her comment suggests that district courts could require it. Notice of any proposed settlement will probably also have to indicate whether opting out is still feasible (in terms of whether an individual action can be filed).
As Justice Ginsberg further noted, one impact of CalPERS may be to slow down the settlement process, as defendants may prefer to settle only after the statute of repose has expired (in order to limit opt outs to those who had earlier filed an individual action). This is debatable. Others believe that most institutional investors are sophisticated and will file a parallel action as a matter of course (in which case delay would achieve little for defendants). But this remains to be seen, as smaller institutions may not want to incur the costs of filing an individual action, at least until they are dismayed by the settlement. At a minimum, few defendants are likely to announce a settlement just before the repose period expires.
Conversely, the announcement of a settlement may also lead some institutional investors to wish to rejoin the class (in order to economize on the costs of individual litigation and avoid the risk of an adverse judgment). Questions may arise about their ability to do so after the statute of repose has expired.
Some defense counsel are even arguing that a class may not be certified after the statute of repose has expired, notwithstanding that the action was filed on a timely basis. At present, this seems an extreme interpretation of CalPERS. One recent decision interpreting CalPERS cuts both ways. In Pasternack v.
Schrader, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 12513 (2d Cir. July 13, 2017), the Second Circuit ruled that a plaintiff who filed a motion to amend within the limitations period did so on a timely basis, even though the ruling granting the motion came afterwards. The panel said that "for purposes of a statute of repose, when a plaintiff moves for leave to amend to add claims within the limitations period and attaches a proposed amended complaint to the motion, the claims are timely." Although not precisely on point, this language suggests that if class certification is sought before the statute of repose expires, the motion need not be ruled upon before the expiration of the repose period.
The gray area under Pasternack, however, would arise when the class action is filed on a timely basis within the repose period, but no motion to certify a class is filed until after the expiration of that period. Defendants were, of course, on notice that a class action would be sought, but no motion to certify was filed, so as to come within the Pasternack formula. Such a case will likely soon arise because plaintiffs generally prefer to defer class certification until a settlement is reached in order to pass the considerable costs of notifying class members onto the settling defendants. However, if there is no settlement in prospect as the statute of repose's expiration point approaches, plaintiff's counsel will face a difficult choice: whether to bear these costs, themselves and file the certification motion, or to wait and argue that defendants had full knowledge that a class action was being sought. We express no view on how a court should rule here.
C. Statute of Limitations for SEC Disgorgement
In a decision that surprised no one, the Supreme Court unanimously held in Kokesh v. Securities and Exchange Commission 12 that the five year limitations period for SEC enforcement proceedings seeking a "civil fine, penalty, or forfeiture" also applies to disgorgement sought by the SEC. The Court reasoned that disgorgement amounts to a penalty because (1) the SEC uses that remedy to redress harm to the public and to deter securities law violations, and (2) its primary purpose was not compensation to investors. In a footnote that may overshadow the decision, the Court suggested (or at least hinted) that authority to order disgorgement in SEC proceedings may be subject to constitutional challenge. 13 Easterbrock gave an incisive example of why a simple positive and negative ("up and down") price movement may not happen and why it should not be required. Suppose, he hypothesized, that the market expects the company to announce a $50 million loss, and it instead announces a $100 million loss, but its real loss was $200 million. 43 On the false and understated announcement, the market price will go down, not up, and on the corrective disclosure, it will presumably go down more. Hence, the "up and down" price pattern is far from inevitable or logical.
H. Confidential Witnesses in Securities Litigation
Because of the uniquely high pleading standards imposed by the PSLRA in securities litigation, which require the plaintiff to plead facts giving rise to a "strong inference" of scienter, 44 plaintiff's counsel have responded by pleading statements made by unidentified "confidential witnesses." The Circuits are divided in the weight they will give to such pleadings, with the Seventh Circuit holding that 41 In re Vivendi S. the statements of confidential witnesses should be "substantially discounted" 45 while the Second and Third Circuits permit the use of confidential witnesses "provided they are described with sufficient particularity to support the probability that a person in the position occupied by the source would possess the information." 46 Still, once one goes behind the formal doctrine and looks at the facts of these cases, there seem to be some fact patterns that trouble (and sometimes shock) judges across all these Circuits. Here, it is useful to begin with probably the best known of these decisions: Judge Posner's 2013 opinion in the Boeing litigation. 47 There, the issue was whether senior executives at Boeing were already aware of certain stress problems that had developed in the wings of Boeing's new "Dreamliner" aircraft at the time they announced (incorrectly) that there would be no delay in its initial flight test. The District Court had initially dismissed the complaint for failure to plead facts giving rise to a strong inference of scienter, but had allowed plaintiffs to file an Amended Complaint. The district judge then reversed her initial decision when the Amended Complaint pled that a confidential witness, described as a Boeing "chief engineer"
who had worked on wing-stress tests on the Dreamliner, had seen "internal contemporaneous communications regarding the specific results of the tests and copies of internal communications to Boeing's senior executives" informing [them] that "the tests had failed and a delay was likely."
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This seemed like a "smoking gun," but it had no basis in fact. The "confidential witness" had not worked for Boeing, but only for a contractor performing low-level engineering work on a different model airplane, and had never been shown the complaint. Nor did the witness have access to Boeing's internal data. Finally, the witness denied most of the statements attributed to him. Based on evidence to this effect, defendants convinced the trial court to reconsider her earlier denial of the motion to dismiss, and the court dismissed the complaint with prejudice. What had gone wrong? In a story that has occurred repeatedly, the confidential witness had been interviewed by two investigators, first in a phone call with one, and the in a two hour interview with the second. None of the plaintiff's attorneys had met the witness until after the second amended complaint had been filed; no tape recording was taken at the interview, and each investigator was alone with the witness and had no corroborating witness as to what was said.
On appeal, to the Seventh Circuit, the plaintiff's challenged the ability of the trial court to make findings on disputed facts on a motion to dismiss, but Judge Posner found that because the plaintiffs had "abandoned" "their sole confidential source"-without whom the case had earlier been dismissed-there was nothing remaining in dispute. 49 The Seventh Circuit also insisted that Rule 11 sanctions be imposed, and the District Court did so.
Not surprisingly, in a number of cases, defendants have been able to identify and interview a confidential witness for plaintiffs and have filed the witness's affidavit, which denies that the witness ever said what the complaint alleged he said, with their motion to dismiss. But this presents a procedural challenge for the district court: How is it to resolve disputed facts on a motion to dismiss when it is normally expected at this stage to accept all well-pleaded facts? The one decision that provides a clear answer is Campo v. Sears Holding Corp. 50 There, the district court noted that plaintiff's complaint was thin and hinged on statements by confidential witnesses. 51 Although it denied defendant's motion to dismiss, it did so without prejudice and ordered a limited number of depositions of the confidential witnesses. Finding ultimately that these witnesses' statements at these depositions did not corroborate the statements attributed to them in the complaint, the court dismissed the complaint. On appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed, noting that the "anonymity of these sources of plaintiff's factual allegations concerning This decision will surprise orthodox proceduralists because it implies that Tellabs reframes the motion to dismiss for securities law cases, converting it into a comparison of competing inferences at which some discovery may be permitted. Effectively, the motion to dismiss begins to approach a minisummary judgment motion. How other Circuits will respond to Campo remains to be seen.
Probably the most interesting and revealing District Court decision on confidential witnesses is Judge Engelmayer's opinion in In re Millennial Media, Inc. Securities Litigation, 54 because he there undertook to set forth ethical best practices to be satisfied by plaintiff's attorneys in connection with their use of confidential witnesses. In the Millennial case, plaintiff's complaint attributed information to some eleven confidential witnesses. Then, one confidential witness (CW-4) informed plaintiffs that he did not wish to be quoted, and plaintiffs sought permission from the Court to file a "Supplemental Amended
Complaint" that would delete all reference to CW-4. Concerned whether CW-4 had also disputed the statements attributed to him and whether plaintiffs had followed appropriate practices in dealing with confidential witnesses, the Court directed that (1) a sworn affidavit be filed by plaintiffs, signed by a "personally knowledgeable attorney explaining with specificity" the circumstances by which CW-4's statements were included in the complaint, and (2) a sworn affidavit from CW-4 recounting his version of these events. When these affidavits were filed, it appeared that CW-4 had only been interviewed once, telephonically, by an investigator, had never been told that he would be quoted, had not been shown the complaint before it was filed, and had disputed the accuracy of several of the statements in the complaint attributed to him. Defendants then filed documents indicating that CWs 5, 8, and 11 also objected to being quoted, and some disputed the accuracy of their statements. Eventually, after further submissions mandated by the Court, the Court found that plaintiff's counsel had never spoken to 10 of the 11 persons 53 See 371 F. Appendix 212, 216 n. 4. The Court justified this investigation into "good faith" based on Rule 11's requirement "that there be a good faith basis for the factual and legal contentions contained in a pleading…" Id. identified as CWs; none of the 11 knew that they were to be quoted; four of the 11 (CWs 4, 5, 8, and 11) had asked to be removed from the Complaint, and at least four claimed to have either been misquoted or misleadingly quoted.
At this point, plaintiffs filed a motion for voluntary dismissal of the action, to which defendants consented. Finding these practices "unsettling" and "problematic," the Court indicated that, even if these practices were industry-wide (as plaintiff's counsel asserted), it found them unacceptable for two reasons:
(1) the potential for inaccuracy, and (2) the unfairness to such witnesses. The Court then added that plaintiff's counsel failure "to confirm the quotes of a witness on whom counsel purposes to rely in a public filing sits at best uneasily alongside Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11."
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The Court make clear that the use of an investigator to conduct the initial interview was entirely appropriate, but, it added, Rule 11's requirement of an "inquiry reasonable under the circumstances…demands more." The Court's bottom line was that it expected "counsel before filing the Complaint, to attempt to confirm with the witness the statements that counsel proposes to attribute to him and to assure that the Complaint is presenting these statements in fair context." 56 "Basic decency," it added, requires the same. It concluded:
"[C]ounsel here treated these people shabbily. The Court's hope and expectation is that, in future cases, counsel will aspire to do better."
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There is new interest on the Federal Rules Committee (and elsewhere) in attempting to develop "best practices" for certain forms of litigation, and the use of confidential witnesses may be one of the first areas where such "best practices" are specified. Millennial Media could prove to be the model. 55 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 69534 at *32-*33. 56 Id at *34. 57 Id at *44.
II. Ascertainability
"Ascertainbility" continues to be one of the most controversial and fluctuating doctrinal developments in class action certification. The requirement is not found in the Rule itself, but instead is a gloss on the requirements of a class definition (found in Rule 23(c)(1)(B)) and of notice (found in 23(c) (2)). If the class must be defined and given notice, then class members must be able to be ascertained -that is, found so that they can be given notice.
Currently the landscape with respect to ascertainability splits the Circuits three ways. The In between these two, some courts hold that plaintiff must show that they will be able to identify each injured class member, but will permit affidavits or other, relatively easy, methods to obtain proof of membership to be used to comply with this requirement. Courts that fall into this category are the Fourth, Sixth (although they may be moving towards a more rigorous standard), Eleventh, and Eighth Circuits. the issue was presented as one of standing rather than ascertainability), and suggested that PIMCO "depose a random sample of class members to determine how many were net gainers from the alleged manipulation and therefore were not injured, and if it turns out to be a high percentage he could urge the district court to revisit its decision to certify the class." Kohen, 571 F.3d at 679. Such a procedure has yet to be attempted.
Further complicating matters, it is sometimes it is difficult for courts to distinguish the ascertainability from the predominance requirement, especially in cases falling under the second type of identification problem, that is, the problem of proof of membership in the class rather than the problem of identity. In many cases, the predominance requirement actually does the analytical work that some courts are using the ascertainability requirement to do, but predominance has the benefit of being part of the Rule. The position of the Second Circuit conflicts in a way that underscores the confusion. In In re Petrobras Sec., 862 F.3d 250, 257 (2d Cir. 2017) the Second Circuit held that a class is "ascertainable if it is defined using objective criteria that establish a membership with definite boundaries" and not requiring administrative feasibility at certification). The defendant's argument was that the class members who purchased securities in the U.S. market could not be separated from those who did not (such purchases were a predicate to liability). The Second Circuit ultimately reversed class certification on grounds of predominance rather than ascertainbility, and hinted that it may be applying a higher predominance requirement in some cases. held that proof of injury was too individualized due to "complicated and individualized" process of determining ownership of land. It decided the issue on ascertainbility grounds, but the problem identified is a fairly traditional and straightforward predominance question that ought to have been decided on predominance grounds.
The reason for courts to prefer considering these issues as part of the 23(b)(3) analysis rather than as a separate heightened ascertainability requirement is that the structure of the Rule permits balancing The defendant in Briseno v. ConAgra Foods has petitioned the Supreme Court for certiorari on the ascertainability question. If the Court grants cert then it will be a difficult case for the textualists on the Court, who tend to be critical of class actions and are likely to want to uphold an ascertainability requirement even though it is not found in the Rule.
III. Justiciability
A. Standing withdrawn from the court's registry only under the control of, and with the permission of, the court…." Id. Recovery Assocs., LLC, 840 F.3d 333, 335 (6th Cir. 2016) ("a 'judgment that should never have been entered does not snuff out a plaintiff's stake in the underlying litigation.").
One of the risks created by Campbell-Ewald is that plaintiffs would find it necessary rush to file "placeholder" class certification motions to preserve their rights before defendants could moot the case.
So far, appellate courts have largely held that plaintiffs need not file placeholder motions and are entitled to a "fair opportunity" to seek certification after a case is mooted. For example, the Third Circuit held that when an injunctive claim has been mooted, the plaintiff is still entitled to a "fair opportunity" to seek class certification. Richardson v. Bledsoe, 829 F.3d 273, 283 (3d Cir. 2016). The Court explained "Our ruling today is intended to have the salutary effect of discouraging these premature motions in favor of motions brought within a reasonable period of time and after proper factual development of the claims has occurred. This is so because a plaintiff, by waiting until it would be appropriate to seek class certification, does not run the risk of having the entire class action mooted in the interim." It is important to note that the "pick off" tactic might not be effective in some contexts-such as securities or antitrust class actions-where the class representative often holds multimillion dollar claims that would be prohibitive to settle at their full face value, but it seemed promising as a defense tactic in defective products and consumer fraud cases where the class representative usually has a small, "negative value" claim that it could not afford to pursue individually. In such a context, the defendants could easily pay off even a string of individual plaintiffs, until the plaintiff's attorney ran out of individual clients with whom to pursue a class action.
IV. Changes to Rule 23
Changes to Rule 23 are coming after a few years of research and contemplation on the part of the Rule 23 Subcommittee. There is every indication that the Rule changes will be approved this year. The changes are unlikely to bring major changes to class action practice, but they do codify some best practices.
The most significant of the changes is probably the provision on objectors. Under the current iteration of the Rule, objectors only needed to obtain court approval to withdraw their objection, but were not required to reveal any information regarding their reasons for withdrawing their objection. Concerns have often been raised about objectors who use the delay of an appeal to pressure the plaintiffs' counsel to pay them a substantial sum (relative to other class members) in exchange for withdrawing their objection.
Some commentators were also concerned that groups of class members were bought off in this way at the expense of other class members who did not object, but more recently the concerns have largely been about objectors using the threat of delay to extract additional payments for themselves without benefitting the whole class. To address this problem, the new Rule 23(e)(5) requires objectors to obtain court approval to be paid in connection with withdrawing their objection either at the district court or appellate level. Notably, side agreements are still not required to be disclosed, only the fact of the agreement.
The revised Rule also includes new provisions with respect to settlements. First, a "front loading"
provision allows the judge to evaluate the likelihood of the settlement being approved before ordering notice of the settlement, so that two notices need not be sent out if the judge determines the settlement is not fair and equitable. In the revised language, a judge must order notice "if giving notice is justified by the parties' showing that the court will likely be able to: (i) approve the proposal under Rule 23(e)(2); and
(ii) certify the class for purposes of judgment on the proposal." Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(1)(B) (as revised).
Judges were already doing this, but now this best practice is incorporated formally into the rule. Fed. R.
Civ. P. 23(e)(3).
Second, the Rule will spell out the major considerations for a court to approve a settlement as fair and equitable. They are:
(A) the class representatives and class counsel have adequately represented the class; (B) the proposal was negotiated at arm's length; (C) the relief provided for the class is adequate, taking into account:
(i) the costs, risks, and delay of trial and appeal;
(ii) the effectiveness of the proposed method of distributing relief to the class, including the method of processing class-member claims, if required;
(iii) the terms of any proposed award of attorney's fees, including timing of payment; and any agreement required to be identified under Rule 23(e)(3); and (iv) any agreement required to be identified under Rule 23(e)(3); and (D) class members are treated equitably relative to each other.
These are not (we hope) listed in order of their importance, as the fact that class members are treated equitably is listed last rather than as the first consideration. We address the significance of some of these provisions for attorney's fees below.
Finally, the revised Rule permits notice to be electronically disseminated or by first class mail, as appropriate. This does not change the general rule that notice must be reasonably calculated to notify the class members of the pendency of the action under the circumstances, but as some judges were rejecting notice that was not first class mail (even though the prevailing rule did not require it), the revision was felt to be necessary. This could make notice considerably cheaper in cases where email notice is appropriate, but it is important to remember that for some populations web-based notice will not suffice.
V. Appeals of Class Certification Orders
Appeals from class certification orders usually fall under Rule 23(f), which permits the appellate courts to take appeals from class certification decisions at their discretion. In Microsoft Corp. v. Baker, One important aspect of the opinion is Justice Ginsburg's focus on parity between plaintiffs and defendants. She explained that "[r]espondents' theory permits plaintiffs only, never defendants, to force an immediate appeal of an adverse certification ruling. Yet the "class issue" may be just as important to defendants. . ." Id. at 1715. This is important because the "death knell" theory for interlocutory appeals was a plaintiff's theory (that denial of certification meant a "death knell" for the class). By contrast, the move towards permitting appeals under 23(f) was driven largely by the increased perception in the 1990s that defendants faced "blackmail" if classes were certified.
Justice Ginsburg emphasized the language of the Rule itself and the "carefully calibrated" balance struck by the rule-makers. She also made heavy use of the Committee Notes, an interpretative approach that had come under fire from Justice Scalia and which may prove important if the question of whether ascertainability is a valid requirement for class certification ever comes before the Court. 
VI. Injunctive Class Actions
One disturbing development in 23(b)(2) class actions has been the increasing deployment of the argument that class certification is not necessary because the court's grant of an injunction and declaratory relief as to the individual plaintiff will be binding on the defendant and inure to the benefit of the entire class. There is no necessity requirement in Rule 23 and indeed the short statement of the requirement for certifying a (b)(2) class does not admit much in the way of policy considerations as to the benefits of proceeding collectively, unlike (b)(3) which does. See Rule 23(b)(2) (" the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the class, so that final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate respecting the class as a whole"). It is hard to find in this language the requirement that courts balance whether class or individual proceedings are preferable, but some courts have stated that necessity may be considered as part of the question of whether "relief is appropriate respecting the class as a whole" which strikes one of us as an implausible reading.
In any event, it is worth asking why a defendant would want to fight class certification if the injunction will indeed force it to act similarly with respect to all class members. The very fact that defendant opposes the class action indicates that it will derive some benefit from proceeding individually, and that benefit is likely to be that it can treat the decision more narrowly than if it had been class wide.
Thus, this is an especially worrying tool in the hands of recalcitrant defendants. 
VII. After the Settlement: Fees and the Distribution Process
The post-settlement context includes a range of issues and problems, some of which courts have tended to slight.
A. Attorney's Fee Awards.
Nearest and dearest to the plaintiff's attorney's heart is the topic of attorney's fees. Classically, there are two approaches: the percentage of the recovery and the lodestar (with the former being much more frequently used). Nonetheless, in July, 2017, the 10 th Circuit surprised many by announcing that the "percentage of the recovery" formula could not be used in a case involving a $52 million settlement based on underpayment of royalties on gas from oil wells. In short, although Rule 23 requires the court to approve the fee award in a class action, it never specifies the criteria or methodology, and here the court must look to state law. The 10 th Circuit also drew a distinction between "substantive fees" and "procedural fees." The former depend on the outcome of the case (i.e., contingent fees are one example) and must be determined under state law, while procedural fees are fees given to the court's discretion (such as the fees for a violation of Rule 11) and are determined by federal law.
This holding will not affect attorney's fees in cases founded on federal question jurisdiction, but courts hearing, for example, derivative actions based on diversity may be well required to look to state law in awarding attorney fees. Of course, the fact that state law controls does not imply that the percentage of recovery method is invalid under state law. Oklahoma had a special rule in this regard.
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Other states take the percentage of the fund approach. Lastly, they found that lodestar cross-checks are associated with significantly higher fee awards Their hypothesis is that lawyers use the cross-check as a justification only when they anticipate a possible fee reduction.
This evidence about inter-Circuit variation and the limited utility of the cross-check does not necessarily lead to any specific reform proposal, but Professors Baker, Perino, and Silver do advance one:
the lead plaintiff should negotiate a fee when retaining class counsel and disclose it to the district court when it is asked to approve the choice of class counsel. Generally, they suggest, the court should defer to these provisions unless "clearly unreasonable." Arguably, this is a "best practices" standard, and it is similar to practices actually followed today in the Seventh Circuit, where deference is given to fee formulas negotiated by sophisticated institutional investors. 71 Nonetheless, outside the Seventh Circuit, this approach has not attracted much judicial support.
B. Holdbacks and Proposed Rule 23(e) (2) award (say, 50%) until the settlement has been distributed or largely distributed. They believe that this encourages expedition on the part of plaintiff's attorneys.
Recently, proposed Rule 23(e)(2) seeks to encourage the use of holdbacks. In particular, it provides that before approving a class action settlement as "fair, reasonable, and adequate," the court should consider a variety of factors, including:
"(C)(iii) the terms of any proposed award of attorney's fees, including timing of payment;…"
The proposed rule then explains in a Committee Note that:
"The proposed handling of an award of attorney's fees under Rule 23(h) ordinarily should be addressed in the parties' submission to the court. In some cases, it will be important to relate the amount of an award of attorney's fees to the expected benefit to the class. One way to address this issue is to defer some or all of the award of attorney's fees until the court is advised of the actual claims rate and results."
This use of holdbacks goes beyond using them to expedite payment to the class and sees them as a way of relating the award to the amount actually received by the class. It should not be forgotten that, in the case of securities class actions, federal law mandates that the fee award not exceed a "reasonable percentage" of the amount "actually paid to the class."
C. Smaller Claimants and Equitable Distribution
Another important topic at the "post-settlement" stage is how to reach the smaller claimant.
Securities litigation typically has many large claimants (i.e., institutional investors), and today they do typically file claims and are well compensated. In party, this may be because the size of securities class actions settlements has recently increased. As they have, institutional investors have become much more interested in filing claims.
But this does not imply that smaller claimants file claim forms at a similar rate. In the world of consumer class actions, the data is sparse but what exists indicates that most of the time claiming rates are very low. This high variance may be a product of the method for claiming imposed by the settlement.
That is, the claims filing rate can be under 1% (and sometimes considerably lower, as some anecdotal evidence suggests that was collected in the legislative history to the proposed "Fairness in Class Actions" statute, which recently passed the House). 73 Alternatively, the rate may sometimes be as high as 60-
70%
. 74 Often, a low claiming rate may be the result of elaborate documentation requirements imposed by defendants; sometimes, it may reflect class member indifference to a small recovery, a reaction to the time involved in filling out even modest forms, or the form of notice. Generally, defendants only have a strong incentive to impose a burden on claiming when the settlement is a "claims made" or reversionary one (which settlements are increasingly uncommon). New electronic claims methods that permit class members to obtain compensation through online vendors such as Amazon or Paypal anecdotally report higher uptake rates, although there are no published studies available. More transparency here is needed, before any overall evaluation of the success of consumer class actions is possible.
In the securities class action field, there are usually repeated distributions (three or four) until the amount left in the fund is reduced to a level that is below the mailing costs of another distribution (and this balance is then distributed in a cy pres distribution to some charity). This pattern does not, however, resolve all concerns. Arguably, in securities class actions, a fundamental conflict of interest surrounds the distribution process. The lead plaintiff is, by law, a large investor with one of the largest stakes in the 73 For example, in one case a declaration by a settlement claims administrator stated that the median claims rate for consumer class action settlements is .23%. See Poertner v. The Gillette Company, 612-CV-00803 (GAP) (Decl. of Deborah McComb, April 21, 2014, ¶ 5) ("KCC did an analysis six months ago of all consumer class action settlements that KCC administered where the notice provided to class members relied entirely on media notice rather than direct mail notice. These settlements included products such as toothpaste, children's clothing, heating pads, gift cards, an over-the-counter medication, a snack food, a weight loss supplement and sunglasses. The claims rate in these cases ranged between .002% and 9.378%, with a median rate of .023%."). We do not know the claiming rate when direct mail notice, email notice, or other forms of notice are used. action, and it, as a practical matter, chooses class counsel, and heavily influences the choice of the Claims Administrator. Large investors have very little incentive to spend significant funds in locating small investors (with whom they would then have to share the settlement fund if they were located). I do not suggest that anyone discourages small claimants, but the zeal of large institutional investors to find small claimants with whom to share the settlement fund is not overwhelming. Admittedly, at some point, the effort to find small claimants would be disproportionate and excessive. It would be silly to spend $1 million to convince an additional $200,000 in small claims to file. But we are not near that point.
Proposed Rule 23(e)(2)(D) arguably addresses this tension by requiring the court to consider in evaluating the fairness of the settlement whether "the proposal treats class members equitably relative to each other." If approved, this provision focuses the court on intra-class disparities.
What should be done? Rule 23(e) (2) suggests that the court should consider the "claims rate" in determining the fee award. Possibly also, the district court should play a stronger role in selecting and supervising the Claims Administrator. As a best practice, the District Court could ask (and be advised) as to the claims filing rates for investors at different ownership levels (e.g., over $1 million, below $1 million, and down to under $10,000). in various benefit programs. The action settled for $680 million, but it proved infeasible to distribute more than $300 million to claimants, as few filed. A revised settlement was negotiated under the court's supervision that provided for the remainder to be distributed both to cy pres beneficiaries and to those who had received an earlier distribution. This did not satisfy some class members who wanted the entire remainder to be distributed proportionately to those who had earlier filed claims and received an initial distribution.
In the course of rejecting these claimants, the D.C. Circuit panel discussed decisions in other
Circuits that had rejected cy pres distributions and found that they involved fact patterns in which the cy pres distribution was not expressly negotiated in the settlement. 75 By implication, it agreed that standardless discretion might be improper, as was the court or special master making the distribution according to its own preferences and without authorization in the settlement agreement. On its facts, Cir. 2010 ). In these cases, either the beneficiaries were completely unrelated to the purposes of the litigation or the court or magistrate had standardless discretion to pick the receipients. subs sold by the Subway sandwich chain were not in fact twelve inches long. 76 In settlement, Subway agreed to a disclaimer about the length of its "foot-long" subs, to cap attorney's fees at $525,000 (that is, that it would agree to such a fee), and that each class representative should receive no more than $1,000
for his efforts. The court approved the settlement, awarding $520,000 in fees and $500 to each class representative. Id. at *3. The objector appealed. In its decision to reverse and remand, the Seventh Circuit wrote:
Here, the procedures required by the settlement do not benefit the class in any meaningful way. The settlement acknowledges as much when it says that uniformity in bread length is impossible due to the natural variability of the bread-baking process. Contempt as a remedy to enforce a worthless settlement is itself worthless. Zero plus zero equals zero.
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Little more can be said except that this exemplifies the need for constant vigilance of class action settlements and the importance of structuring attorney's fees to provide incentives for class counsel to produce better outcomes for class members. and is therefore unenforceable. The decision distinguished "public" injunctive relief from "private" injunctive relief, finding that the former sought to enjoin acts that "threaten future injury to the general public" and benefitted the plaintiff only to an "incidental" degree.
VIII. Arbitration
The Sixth Circuit joined two other courts of appeal in finding that arbitration provisions that permit only individual arbitration of employment-related claims violate the National Labor Relations Act ("NLRB"). 82 The Circuits are split on this issue, and the Supreme Court will hear arguments at its first session on October 2, 2017 in three consolidated cases that all raise the issue of whether the NLRB prohibits mandatory arbitration provisions with class action waivers. 83 The Department of Justice's amicus brief has argued that the NLRB does not preclude class action waivers. At the moment, the NLRB disagrees, but as membership on the board changes there may be changes to its litigation position as well. Given that this decision will likely overshadow lower court decisions, we will abbreviate our discussion of this complicated topic and wait for the Supreme Court to speak.
Finally, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau ("CFPB") promulgated a new rule 84 prohibiting the providers of certain consumer financial products from using arbitration clauses that bar class action suits. As of this writing, the House of Representatives voted to approve a veto of the new rule (mostly along party lines), but the measure has not yet been voted on in the Senate. Absent further
Congressional action, the rule will become effective on September 18, 2017, but Congress has a few weeks after that date to act.
Moving in the opposite direction, SEC Commissioner Michael S. Piwowar has recently suggested that the SEC should drop its long-standing hostility to mandatory arbitration provisions in corporate charters, and allow public companies to preclude class actions with such a provision. 85 If this provision were favored by SEC Chairman Jay Clayton, it would pass the SEC and might block securities class actions directed against companies (and their officers and directors) adopting such a provision. It is, of course, premature to predict how many public companies would adopt such a provision by charter amendment (which institutional investors would likely oppose), but it would be comparatively simple to insert such a provision in the corporate charter of future IPO companies.
IX. Class Actions Before Administrative Agencies
83 These cases are cited supra at note 2. 84 12 CFR 1040 85 For a review of his statements and their potential impact, see "The Problems with Mandatory Arbitration of Securities Claims," Law360, August 9, 2017.
